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Number of documents

9

CV


Conference papers6 documents

  • Thomas Nedelec, Jules Baudet, Vianney Perchet, Noureddine El Karoui. Adversarial learning for revenue-maximizing auctions. 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2021, Londres, United Kingdom. ⟨hal-03089784⟩
  • Clément Calauzènes, Thomas Nedelec, Vianney Perchet, Noureddine El Karoui. Robust Stackelberg buyers in repeated auctions. dInternational Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2020, virtual, France. ⟨hal-03089777⟩
  • Rémy Degenne, Thomas Nedelec, Clément Calauzènes, Vianney Perchet. Bridging the gap between regret minimization and best arm identification, with application to A/B tests. AISTATS 2019 - 22nd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, Apr 2019, Okinawa, Japan. ⟨hal-02457477⟩
  • Thomas Nedelec, Noureddine El Karoui, Vianney Perchet. Learning to bid in revenue-maximizing auctions. 36 th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2019, Long Beach, France. ⟨hal-03089621⟩
  • Alexandre Gilotte, Clément Calauzènes, Thomas Nedelec, Alexandre Abraham, Simon Dollé. Offline A/B Testing for Recommender Systems. Eleventh ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, Feb 2018, Marina Del Rey, United States. pp.198-206, ⟨10.1145/3159652.3159687⟩. ⟨hal-02457457⟩
  • Thomas Nedelec, Nicolas Le Roux, Vianney Perchet. A comparative study of counterfactual estimators. NeurIPS Workshop: What if, what next., Dec 2017, Long Beach, United States. ⟨hal-03089513⟩

Preprints, Working Papers, ...3 documents

  • Thomas Nedelec, Clément Calauzènes, Noureddine El Karoui, Vianney Perchet. Learning in repeated auctions. 2020. ⟨hal-03089800⟩
  • Thomas Nedelec, Marc Abeille, Clément Calauzènes, Benjamin Heymann, Vianney Perchet, et al.. Thresholding at the monopoly price: an agnostic way to improve bidding strategies in revenue-maximizing auctions. 2020. ⟨hal-03089546⟩
  • Marc Abeille, Clément Calauzènes, Noureddine El Karoui, Thomas Nedelec, Vianney Perchet. Explicit shading strategies for repeated truthful auctions. 2020. ⟨hal-03089527⟩