Nombre de documents

57

CV de Dominique LEPELLEY


Article dans une revue46 documents

  • Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Nicolas Sauger. Le Scrutin Binominal Paritaire : Un Regard d'Ingénierie Electorale. Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2017. <hal-01452545>
  • Erik Friese, William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Achill Schürmann. The Impact of Dependence among Voters’ Preferences with Partial Indifference. Quality and Quantity, Springer Verlag, 2016, pp.1-20. <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11135-016-0446-7>. <10.1007/s11135-016-0446-7>. <hal-01450829>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou. A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser. Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2016, 80, pp.115--122. <10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.009>. <hal-01452548>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Florenz Plassmann. Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections. Group Decision and Negotiation, INFORMS, 2016, 25 (5), pp.941--966. <10.1007/s10726-016-9470-1>. <hal-01452552>
  • Hatem Smaoui, Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou. Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections. Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2016, 36 (3), pp.1722--1728. <hal-01452550>
  • Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, Hatem Smaoui. Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2016, 64, pp.11--22. <10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.001>. <hal-01452554>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. Refining measures of group mutual coherence. Quality & Quantity, 2015, pp.1--26. <10.1007/s11135-015-0241-x>. <hal-01243405>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Florenz Plassmann. Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2015, pp.1--41. <10.1007/s00355-015-0920-5>. <hal-01243409>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou. Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox. Quality & Quantity, 2015, 49 (6), pp.2345--2368. <10.1007/s11135-014-0117-5>. <hal-01452557>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules. Group Decision and Negotiation, INFORMS, 2014, 24 (2), pp.243--269. <10.1007/s10726-014-9388-4>. <hal-01450834>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet, Laurent Vidu. Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case. Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2014, 34 (4), pp.2201-2207. <halshs-01102577>
  • Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley. Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820. Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014, Vol. 65 (3), pp.469--518. <hal-01243411>
  • Hatem Smaoui, Dominique Lepelley. Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux : étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin. Revue d Economie Politique, Editions Dalloz, 2014, 123 (6), pp.827--850. <hal-01245306>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Michel Paul, Hatem Smaoui. Introduction à la théorie des jeux (2) : jeux coopératifs. EcoFlash : Mensuel d'informations économiques et sociales, CNDP, 2013. <hal-01258585>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Michel Paul, Hatem Smaoui. Introduction à la théorie des jeux (1) : jeux non coopératifs. EcoFlash : Mensuel d'informations économiques et sociales, CNDP, 2013. <hal-01258586>
  • A. Adametz, Dominique Lepelley. Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (Eds.) : Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010. Social Choice & Welfare, 2013, pp.1231-1235. <hal-01088080>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Issofa Moyouwou, Dominique Lepelley. The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes. Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2013, 66 (3), pp.352--365. <10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.07.007>. <hal-01243417>
  • Dominique Lepelley. Book review: Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.) : Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2013, 40 (4), pp.1231--1235. <hal-01258584>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Hatem Smaoui. Choix collectif et procédures de votes. EcoFlash : Mensuel d'informations économiques et sociales, CNDP, 2012. <hal-01258591>
  • Vincent Merlin, Marc Fleurbaey, Dominique Lepelley. Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2012, 39 (2-3), pp.253-257. <10.1007/s00355-012-0678-y>. <halshs-00734928>
  • Fabrice Barthélémy, Dominique Lepelley, Mathieu Martin. On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2012, 41 (2), pp.263--279. <10.1007/s00355-012-0683-1>. <hal-01243433>
  • Dominique Lepelley. Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2012, 40 (4), pp.1231--1235. <10.1007/s00355-012-0668-0>. <hal-01243445>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Laurent Vidu. Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations. Annales d'Economie et Statistiques, 2011, 101/102, pp.71-85. <halshs-00656832>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet. Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox. Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2011, 62 (1), pp.28-33. <10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.04.006>. <halshs-00602133>
  • Marc Fleurbaey, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin. Introduction to the Special Issue on New Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories. Annals of Economics and Statistics, CNGP-INSEE, 2011, 101-102, pp.7-11. <halshs-00653166>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Hatem Smaoui. The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise. Annals of Economics and Statistics, CNGP-INSEE, 2011, pp.107--125. <hal-01245308>
  • Jery Randrianasolo, P. Lecomte, P. Salgado, Dominique Lepelley. Modeling crop-livestock integration systems on a regional scale in Reunion Island: sugar cane and dairy cow activities. Advances in Animal Biosciences, 2010, 1 (02), pp.498--498. <10.1017/S2040470010001159>. <hal-01245291>
  • Virginie Béhue, Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley. La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale. Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, De Boeck Université, 2010, 75 (4), pp.503--516. <hal-01243465>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2009, 35 (1), pp.1--23. <10.1007/s00355-009-0415-3>. <hal-01243471>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. A note on Condorcet's other paradox. Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (3), pp.2000--2007. <hal-01243468>
  • Dominique Lepelley. Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, and Ilia M. Tsetlin: Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference and applications. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2008, 31 (2), pp.351--355. <10.1007/s00355-008-0314-z>. <hal-01243477>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule. Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2008, 67 (3), pp.267--293. <10.1007/s11238-008-9097-z>. <hal-01243483>
  • Vincent Merlin, Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Jean-Louis Rouet. On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2007, 28 (2), pp.181--207. <10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6>. <halshs-00010168>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Ahmed Louichi, Hatem Smaoui. On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2007, 30 (3), pp.363--383. <10.1007/s00355-007-0236-1>. <hal-01245310>
  • Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet. Voter équitable dans l'Europe à 27. La Recherche : L'actualité des sciences, société d'éditions scientifiques, 2007, 406, pp.50-54. <halshs-00151628>
  • Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley. Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2006, 26 (3), pp.485-509. <10.1007/s00355-006-0106-2>. <halshs-00068839>
  • Vincent Merlin, Dominique Lepelley, Marc Feix, Jean Louis Rouet. The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election. Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2004, 23, pp.227-258. <hal-00010165>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, M. Feix, J.-L. Rouet. The Probability of Conflicts in a US Presidential Type Election. Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2004, 23, pp.227-258. <halshs-00070893>
  • Vincent Merlin, Jean-Lous Rouet, Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley. The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election. Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2004, pp.227-257. <10.1007/s00199-003-0375-2>. <halshs-00083476>
  • Fabrice Valognes, Dominique Lepelley. More on Statistical Manipulability of Social Choice Functions. Public Choice, Springer Verlag, 2004, 116, pp.165-184. <halshs-00069083>
  • Franck Bisson, Jean Bonnet, Dominique Lepelley. La détermination du nombre des délégués au sein des structures intercommunales : une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf. Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, 2010-, 2004, pp.259-282. <hal-00149378>
  • Franck Bisson, Jean Bonnet, Dominique Lepelley. La détermination du nombre de délégués au sein des structures intercommunales : une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf. Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, 2010-, 2004, pp.259-282. <halshs-00069103>
  • Dominique Lepelley, W. V. Gherlhein. On some limitations of the median voting rule. Public Choice, Springer Verlag, 2003, 117, pp.177-190. <halshs-00069247>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Fabrice Valognes. Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity. Public Choice, Springer Verlag, 2003, 116, pp.165-184. <halshs-00069239>
  • Dominique Lepelley, N. Andjiga, F. Chantreuil. La mesure du pouvoir de vote. Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines, Centre de Mathématique Sociale et de statistique, EPHE, 2003, pp.111-145. <halshs-00069255>
  • Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley, Jérôme Serais. Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation. Review of Economic Design, Springer Verlag, 2002, 7, pp.213-228. <halshs-00069522>

Chapitre d'ouvrage7 documents

  • Dominique Lepelley, Michel Paul, Hatem Smaoui. Partage d'un cours d'eau international : l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 2). Lepelley, Dominique and Paul, Michel. Droit, Economie et Gestion de l'Eau dans la Zone Océan Indien et au-delà - Regards croisés, Oeconomica, pp.229--259, 2016. <hal-01452547>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Michel Paul, Hatem Smaoui. Introduction. Lepelley, Dominique and Paul, Michel. Droit, Economie et Gestion de l'Eau dans la Zone Océan Indien et au-delà - Regards croisés, Oeconomica, 2016. <hal-01452555>
  • Dominique Lepelley, Michel Paul, Hatem Smaoui. Partage d'un cours d'eau international : l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 1). Lepelley, Dominique and Paul, Michel. Droit, Economie et Gestion de l'Eau dans la Zone Océan Indien et au-delà - Regards croisés, Oeconomica, pp.208--228, 2016. <hal-01452551>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences. Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé. Electoral systems: paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures, Springer, 2012, 978-3-642-20440-1. <hal-01245273>
  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. The Condorcet ranking efficiency of voting rules. Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé. Electoral systems: paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures, Springer, 2012, 978-3-642-20440-1. <hal-01245272>
  • G. Bily, Dominique Lepelley. Analyse économique du règlement sportif de la coupe du monde de football. Maisonneuve, Mathieu. Droit et Coupe du monde, Economica, 2011, Collection Études juridiques, 978-2-7178-6065-8. <hal-01245280>
  • Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet. On the probability to act in the european union. Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, Fred S. Roberts. The Mathematics of Preferences, Choice and Order, Springer, pp.197-211, 2009, Studies in Social Choice and Welfare. <halshs-00418566>

Ouvrage (y compris édition critique et traduction)1 document

  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the condorcet efficiency of voting rules. Springer, 2011, Studies in choice and welfare, 978-3-642-03106-9. <hal-01243452>

Rapport2 documents

  • William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Florenz Plassmann. To Rank or Not to Rank : A Summary. [Research Report] University of Delaware. 2016, pp.30. <hal-01450826>
  • Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin. Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral. [Research Report] Toulouse School of Economics (TSE). 2016. <hal-01452556>

Pré-publication, Document de travail1 document

  • Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet. Voting Models for the Council of Ministers of the European Union. 2004. <halshs-00003483>